The Dalai Lama is the most recognisable Buddhist figure in the world, and the institution he holds is frequently misdescribed. He is not the head of Tibetan Buddhism, not the head of the Geluk school, and not analogous to a pope. He is the holder of a particular reincarnation lineage that acquired political authority in the seventeenth century and lost its territory in 1959.

The tulku institution #

The underlying mechanism is the tulku, a recognised reincarnation. The doctrine draws on the Mahayana nirmanakaya — the “emanation body” through which an awakened being manifests for the benefit of others — and the Tibetan innovation was to institutionalise it: to identify a specific child as the continuation of a specific deceased teacher, and to transfer to that child the predecessor’s monastery, property, authority, and students.

The first formal application was the Karmapa lineage of the Kagyu school in the thirteenth century, and the practice spread widely. There are now thousands of recognised tulku lineages.

Identification traditionally involves several elements: indications left by the predecessor about the direction or circumstances of rebirth; divination, including consultation of oracles and interpretation of visions at the sacred lake Lhamo Latso; a search by senior lamas; and tests in which the child identifies possessions of the predecessor among substitutes.

As an institution, it solved a real problem — the transmission of authority in celibate lineages, where hereditary succession is unavailable — and created several others. A child ruler means a regency, and Tibetan history is full of regents with reasons to prefer that the incumbent not reach adulthood. Between the seventh and twelfth Dalai Lamas, all but one died young; the historical consensus is that several were probably killed.

The name #

Dalai is Mongolian for “ocean”; lama is Tibetan for a religious teacher. The title was conferred by Altan Khan on Sonam Gyatso in 1578, in a mutual arrangement: the Khan gained Buddhist legitimation for his rule, and the Geluk school gained a Mongol patron.

Sonam Gyatso was counted the third, with the title applied retrospectively to his two predecessors:

Gendun Drup (1391–1474), a student of Tsongkhapa and the founder of Tashilhunpo. Gendun Gyatso (1475–1542).

The Dalai Lamas are held to be emanations of Chenrezig — Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva of compassion — who is also regarded as the particular protector of Tibet.

The Great Fifth #

Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (1617–1682) is the pivotal figure, and Tibetan tradition calls him simply the Great Fifth.

With the military backing of Gushri Khan of the Khoshut Mongols, who defeated the Geluk school’s rivals, the Fifth Dalai Lama became the temporal ruler of a unified Tibet in 1642. He built the Potala Palace in Lhasa, established the governmental structures that lasted until 1959, and negotiated with the Qing court on a footing of the chöyön priest–patron relationship rather than of subordination — a point with obvious contemporary relevance.

He was also a substantial scholar with wide interests, including Nyingma practice, which was unusual for a Geluk hierarch.

His death was concealed for fifteen years by his regent, Sangye Gyatso, to complete the Potala and consolidate the government — an episode that illustrates how much the institution’s power lay with the administration around it.

The fourteenth #

Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935) was born in Amdo, in the Tibetan-populated area of what is now Qinghai province, identified in 1937, and enthroned in 1940.

1950–51. The People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet. The Seventeen Point Agreement was signed in 1951 under conditions the Tibetan side has always maintained were coercive.

1959. Following the Lhasa uprising in March, he fled to India with a large number of followers, and established what became the Central Tibetan Administration at Dharamsala.

Since. He rebuilt the monastic universities — Sera, Drepung, Ganden — in refugee settlements in south India, which now house larger populations than the Tibetan originals. He became an international public figure of a kind no Buddhist leader had been, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, and developed a public role addressing science, ethics, and interreligious dialogue as much as Buddhism specifically.

Politically, he shifted from seeking independence to the “Middle Way Approach,” which accepts Chinese sovereignty and seeks genuine autonomy for Tibetan areas within it — a position criticised by some Tibetans, particularly younger ones, as conceding too much, and rejected by Beijing as separatism in disguise.

In 2011 he devolved all political authority to the elected leadership of the Central Tibetan Administration, formally ending the institution’s temporal role after 369 years. This was deliberate: a succession fight over a purely religious office is a smaller prize than one over a head of government.

On science, he has been unusually forward. The Mind and Life dialogues have run since 1987, monastic curricula in the diaspora now include science education, and his stated position — that if scientific investigation conclusively disproves a Buddhist claim, the claim must be abandoned — is a serious and modernist commitment.

The succession problem #

This is the live issue, and it is unresolved.

The Chinese position is that the reincarnation must be identified according to historical convention and approved by the central government, invoking the Qing-era Golden Urn lottery. State Religious Affairs Bureau Order No. 5, in force since 2007, requires state approval for all tulku reincarnations.

The Dalai Lama’s position has varied in emphasis. He has said the institution may not continue at all; that if it does, the decision rests with the Tibetan people and the relevant lamas; that he might be reborn outside Chinese-controlled territory; that he could be recognised while still alive (madey tulku), a practice with some precedent; and that a woman could hold the position. In a 2011 statement he said he would consult senior lamas and the Tibetan public around his ninetieth birthday and issue clear instructions.

The likely outcome, widely anticipated, is two claimants — one recognised by the Tibetan religious establishment in exile, one appointed by Beijing.

There is a precedent, and it is not encouraging. In 1995 the Dalai Lama recognised Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, then six years old, as the eleventh Panchen Lama — the second-highest Geluk incarnation, and traditionally involved in recognising Dalai Lamas. The boy and his family were taken into Chinese custody within days and have not been seen publicly since; Chinese authorities state he is an ordinary citizen who wishes privacy. A different child, Gyaltsen Norbu, was installed as Panchen Lama by the government.

What the Dalai Lama is and is not #

Not the head of Tibetan Buddhism. Each of the four schools has its own head. The Geluk head is the Ganden Tripa, an appointed academic position, not the Dalai Lama.

Not a pope. No doctrinal authority over other lineages, no power to define doctrine, and no administrative authority over other schools’ institutions.

Not, traditionally, a spiritual leader of all Buddhists. The role he occupies in global public life is a twentieth-century development and has no traditional counterpart.

A Geluk monk, holding full monastic ordination, who has also received transmissions across all four schools in the Rime spirit.

Historically, a temporal ruler — and the Tibetan government he headed was, like other premodern states, hierarchical, with a monastic estate holding substantial land and labour obligations. The romantic Western picture of pre-1959 Tibet as a peaceful spiritual utopia is a construction, and Donald Lopez’s Prisoners of Shangri-La documents how it was built and what it obscures. Acknowledging this does not validate the Chinese account of liberation, and the two claims are frequently treated as though they were the only options.

Common questions #

How is a Dalai Lama identified? By a search conducted by senior lamas, guided by indications left by the predecessor, divination, visions at Lhamo Latso, and tests in which the candidate recognises the predecessor’s belongings. The current Dalai Lama has said the process itself may change.

Could the lineage end? He has said explicitly that it might, and that this would be acceptable — the institution exists to benefit beings, and if it has ceased to do so, there is no reason to continue it.

Does the Dalai Lama choose his own rebirth? Within the tradition, an advanced practitioner is held to have some control over rebirth, and he has spoken about this directly. The practical point he has emphasised is that no one else, including a government, can determine where an individual is reborn.

Why does China care about a religious succession? Because control of the institution is control of a substantial source of legitimacy among Tibetans, and because the precedent of the Panchen Lama suggests the strategy is considered effective.

Is he still the political leader of Tibetans? No. He devolved political authority in 2011 to the elected Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration.

Sources & further reading #

Dalai Lama XIV, Freedom in Exile (HarperCollins, 1990) — the autobiography. Sam van Schaik, Tibet: A History (Yale, 2011) — the best general history, including the institution’s political development. Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 4 vols. (University of California Press, 1989–2019) — the standard detailed account, and unsentimental. Donald S. Lopez Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-La (University of Chicago Press, 1998) — on Western constructions of Tibet. Dalai Lama XIV, The Universe in a Single Atom (Morgan Road, 2005) — the position on science.